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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the rules on burden of proof and procedural due process which obtain
not only in the orthodox courts, but quasi-judicial, administrative pro-
ceedings as well.
ERNEST W. MACHEN, JR.
Conflict of Laws-Divorce-Coflateral Attack on-
Divisibility of-
The United States Supreme Court recently decided four cases which
have significant bearing on the degree of credit to which a foreign de-
cree of divorce is entitled. The legal points dealt with in the first two
cases are different from those in the last two; therefore, they will be
treated separately.
COLLATERAL ATTACK By REsPONDENT WHO APPEARED IN
DIVORCE ACTION
Respondent,' Sherrer, had appeared generally in a divorce action,
brought by petitioner in Florida three months after she left respondent
in Massachusetts where they had resided for twelve years. Petitioner
there alleged, and the Florida court found, that she was a bona fide
resident of Florida. Respondent did not challenge either the allegation
or finding. The divorce was granted. Respondent brought this suit
in Massachusetts in which he alleged that the petitioner was his wife
and prayed that he might be allowed to convey his realty as if he were
sole and living apart from her justifiably. The Probate Court granted
the relief prayed for, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
affirmed on the ground that petitioner was never domiciled in Florida.
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court held that the require-
ments of full faith and credit bar a defendant from attacking collaterally
a divorce decree on jurisdictional grotinds in the courts of a sister state
where there has been participation by the defendant in the divorce
proceedings, and where the defendant has been accorded full oppor-
tunity to contest the jurisdictional issues.2
The Supreme Court had held in Williams v. North Carolinas that
while the finding of domicile by the court that granted the decree is
entitled to prima facie weight, it is not conclusive in the state of matri-
monial domicile but might be relitigated there, in a bigamy prosecution.
In Dazis v. Davis,4 where the defendant had appeared and fully liti-
gated the issue of the plaintiff's domicile, the Court held that the finding
"Petitioner" and "respondent" are used throughout to refer to the petitioner
and respondeht in the divorce proceeding.
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 68 Sup. Ct. 1087 (1948). The decision in this case ap-
plies also to the companion case of Coe v. Coe, 68 Sup. Ct. 1094 (1948), therefore
the cases are treated as one. Accord: In re Biggers, 228 N. C. 743 (1948).
'325 U. S. 226 (1945). See Baer, So Your Client Wants a Divorce, 24 N. C.
L. REv. 1 (1945).
'305 U. S. 32 (1938).
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of domicile in the divorce proceeding was res judicata and binding on
the defendant in all courts.5 In the instant case, the Court held that,
even though the respondent had failed to contest the jurisdiction of the
court in the Florida proceeding, his appearance and participation dis-
tinguished the case froni the situation presented in Williams v. North
Carolina6 and brought it within the rule of the Davis case.7 "If re-
spondent failed to take advantage of the opportunities afforded him,
the responsibility is his own. We do not believe that the dereliction of
a defendant under such circumstances should be permitted to provide
a basis for subsequent attack in a sister state on a decree valid in the
state in which it was rendered." s
In Coe v. Coe,9 decided on the same day as the Sherrer case, the
court held that the rule laid down in the latter case "is no less applicable
where... the party initiating the collateral attack is the party in whose
favor the [divorce] decree was entered."' 0
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with whom Mr. Justice Murphy con-
curred, dissented."1 The dissent was based on the contention that the
decision of the majority renders possible consent divorces by sham pro-
ceedings in a foreign state, which would impair the paramount interest
of the home state in the marital relations of its citizens. "That interest
cannot be bartered or bargained away by the immediate parties to the
controversy by a default or an arranged contest in a proceeding for
divorce in a state to which the parties are strangers.' 2
The interest of Massachusetts in the Sherrer case was likened to
that of North Carolina in the Williams case, the only difference being
that Massachusetts asserted its interests through civil litigation between
private parties, whereas North Carolina did it directly by criminal
In this case the court merely applied law to findings of domicile in divorce
proceedings that it had already applied in other fields of the law. Baldwin v. Iowa
State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522 (1931).
8325 U. S. 226 (1945).
"The principle that res judicata may be pleaded as a bar to jurisdictional ques-
tions which might have been litigated in the earlier proceeding was applied in
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1939).
For a complete discussion of res judicata as applied to jurisdictional questions, see;
Boskey and Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack, 40 CoL. L. REv. 1015
(1940).
868 Sup. Ct. 1087, 1091 (1948).
'68 Sup. Ct. 1094 (1948). The respondent filed a cross complaint in the di-
vorce proceeding, and was granted a divorce and alimony by the Nevada Court.
She then brought contempt proceedings against the petitioner in Massachusetts for
violation of a Massachusetts support order which was in effect before the divorce.
2
0 Id. at 1096.
" 68 Sup. Ct. 1097 (1948). The dissent applied to both cases.
"Id. at 1098. The dissenting justices do not consider Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S.
32 (1938) as contrary authority, because, by their interpretation of that case, the
rule there laid down was dictum inasmuch as the Court found that the state grant-
ing the divorce was in fact that of the domicile. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 68 Sup.
Ct. 1097, 1098 n. 1 (1948).
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prosecution.' 3 The dissent concluded that even if the Florida decision
be accorded "every weight,"'14 the evidence justified the Massachusetts
court in finding no Florida domicile. It criticizes the majority for that
under its decision the home state of the parties is not permitted to ques-
tion the matter regardless of overwhelming evidence that the asserted
domicile is a sham just as long as the parties have gone through the
form of a controversy.
Assimilating the two cases, the principle evolved appears to be this:
where a court of one state has personal jurisdiction over the respondent
in a divorce proceeding, and that respondent has an "opportunity" to
contest the issue of domicile, a decision by the court that the petitioner
is domiciled within the state is res judicata and is binding on both
parties in the state of last marital domicile, both as to marital capacity
and the duty of support.
Several serious questions remain unanswered.15 What effect do
these decisions have on the historic principle that jurisdiction to grant
a divorce is founded on domicile, and a decree granted where there is
no domicile is not entitled to full faith and credit ?1o May this principle
now be nullified by a feigned legal contest in a foreign state, or will the
Court leave open the right, in the home state, to prove fraud,17 i.e.,
that a mock contest was won by prearrangement? 18 If it does so leave
it open, then the decisions render more uncertain a field of law already
thoroughly unsettled.19 If not, then the decisions encourage collusion
and fraud, and make consent divorces available only to those rich
enough to spend six weeks in Nevada. It would also open the door to
an academic argument that divorce proceedings, where both parties
appear, are strictly in personam.
20
Does litigation of the question of jurisdiction by the parties, or the
"opportunity" to do so, foreclose a collateral attack by the state of last
marital domicile? Does it foreclose a collateral- attack by interested
parties not appearing in the suit? Unless we adopt the view of the
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 68 Sup. Ct. 1097, 1100 (1948)." Id. at 1107.
"Baer, So Your Client Wants a Divorce, 24 N. C. L. REv. 1, 30 (1945).
"°Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175 (1901) ; Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S.
226 (1945).
1 See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 68 Sup. Ct. 1097, 1103 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
" One writer suggests that if the finding of domicile is "reasonable" the de-
cision may not be collaterally attacked, but that an "unreasonable" finding would
be subject to collateral attack, even though there is personal jurisdiction. Holt,
Any More Light on Haddock v. Haddock? 39 MicH. L. REv. 689, 715 (1941).
1" In such a case no one would know whether or not the divorce was good or
not until a collateral attack had been made on it, and the issue of fraud or col-
lusion litigated.
" The United States Supreme Court has already discarded the idea that the
proceeding is strictly in rem, but recognize that a divorce decree partakes of
some of the characteristics of a decree in rein. Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U. S. 226 (1945).
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dissent that the state exerts its sovereign power in civil suits between
the parties, these decisions can have no binding effect on the state. But
if the rule of these cases is not applied where the state is attacking the
decree, then the appearance renders the foreign decree valid as regards
civil responsibility but not as to criminal liability.
DuTY OF SUPPORT
In Estin v. Estin2l respondent was awarded a decree of separation
and alimony by a New York court. The petitioner later went to Nevada
and obtained an ex parte divorce which made no provision for alimony.
Therefore, he ceased payment under the New York decree. This was
a suit by the respondent for accrued alimony, in which the petitioner
appeared and moved to eliminate the alimony provisions of that decree.
The New York Supreme Court found that petitioner was a bona fide
resident of Nevada. In spite of this finding the court denied petitioner's
motion and granted respondent a judgment for the arrears which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In affirming, the United States Su-
preme Court held that Nevada had no power to adjudicate the re-
spondent's rights in the New York judgment, and New York need not
give full faith and credit to that phase of the Nevada decree. The
New York judgment is an intangible property interest of respondent,
which grants rights to her and imposes obligations on petitioner. The
state of the domicile of a debtor has no power to determine the personal
rights of the creditor in this interest, unless it has jurisdiction over his
person. Nevada cannot thus exercise an in personam jurisdiction over
a person not before the court.
Petitioner attempted to show that by the law of New York its courts
have no power to compel a man to support his ex-wife, and that a sup-
port order does not survive divorce. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for
the majority, had no trouble with this contention. "The difficulty with
that argument is that the highest court in New York has held in this
case that a support order can survive divorce .. .. That conclusion is
binding on us .... ,22 Earlier decisions are immaterial so long as New
York today says that is her policy.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented.23 He readily agreed with the
proposition that New York might decline to allow any ex parte divorce
to dissolve its prior separate maintenance decree. But he asserted that
New York could not give less effect to a valid Nevada divorce than it
would give a New York divorce similarly obtained. Since it was not
clear whether or not the New York law discriminated against foreign
' Estin v. Estin, 68 Sup. Ct. 1213 (1948). The companion case of Kreiger v.
Kreiger, 68 Sup. Ct. 1221 (1948) is indistinguishable, therefore the decision ap-
plies to both cases.22Estin v. Estin, 68 Sup. Ct. 1213, 1216 (1948).
" See, id. at 1219 (dissenting opinion).
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divorces, Mr. Justice Frankfurter would remand the case to the New
York Court of Appeals for clarification on that point.
Mr. Justice Jackson wrote a separate dissent.2 4 He agreed with Mr.
Justice Frankfurter that the Nevada judgment should have the same
effect as a similar New York judgment. He also objected to the de-
cision on the ground that it made the Nevada decision half good and
half bad, whereas the Constitution commands that it be given full faith
and credit.
The majority opinion 25 frankly recognizes that the result of the
decision is to make divorces divisible,
2 6 putting some of the elements 27
within the control of the state of the husband's domicile and leaving
others in the control of the state of the wife's domicile. "It accommo-
dates the interests of both Nevada and New York in this broken mar-
riage by restricting each state to the matters of her dominant concern."
2 8
The complexity of the American law of divorce may be attributed
to the widely divergent local views with regard to divorce and the fact
that a wife is allowed to maintain a domicile separate from that of her
husband.29 Since we allow separate domiciles, and it would be unde-
sirable to override local policy with respect to divorce, a compromise
seems to be the only solution for the courts.30 This was accomplished
in the instant case by apportioning to the two states jurisdiction over the
legal components of the marital status in which they have a dominant
interest.3'
It was established in Williams v. North Caroliu) 2 in overruling
" Id. at 1220 (dissenting opinion).
25Id. at 1218.
" This principle was suggested by Mr. Justice Douglas in a footnote in Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 n. 4 (1942). In Esenwien v. Pennsylvania
325 U. S. 279 (1945) he was joined by Justices Black and Rutledge in a con-
curring opinion in which he advocated the divisible divorce and declared that
there is a "basic difference between the problem of marital capacity and the prob-
lem of support."
" The decision only divides divorce into two elements, 1. marital capacity, and
2. duty of support. There may be additional elements such as; capacity of the
wife to remarry, property rights of the husband, property rights of the wife, duty
of husband to support the wife, duty of husband to support the children.
" Estin v. Estin, 68 Sup. Ct. at 1218 (1948).
" Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled? 18 IND. L. J. 165 (1942).
8 Advocacy of legislative reform is beyond the scope of this note, which is in-
tended to be confined to the technical legal problems involved. So much has al-
ready been written on that subject that further comment would be wasted effort.
Bingham, In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock, 21 CoRmN.= L. Q. 393, 405
(1936).
Uniformity in divorce is for Congress, not the courts. See Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, dissenting, Sherrer v. Sherrer, 68 Sup. Ct. 1097, 1101 (1948).
8 The divisible divorce has been advocated by several imminent legal writers.
Among these are: Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overrled?, 18 IND. L. J. 165
(1942); Bingham, In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock, 21 CORNELL L. Q. 393
(1936) ; Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 HARv. L. Ray. 930 (1945); Barn-
hard, Haddock Reversed-Harbinger of the Divisible Divorce, 31 GEo. L. J. 210
(1943).38 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
[Vol. 27
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Haddock v. Haddock,3 3 that the state of the husband's domicile has
sufficient interest in his marital status to restore his marital capacity.
The instant -case establishes that the state where the stay-behind spouse
has long been domiciled has an interest in making the husband continue
a prior obligation to support her, which interest is stronger than any to
be accredited to the state of the husband's new domicile.8 4
Only by refusing to recognize that the marital status is made up of
several elements can it be argued that full faith and credit has been
denied the Nevada decree.85 The marital capacity of Mr. Estin was
restored by the Nevada decree not only by Nevada law but under the
law of New York. On the other band, his marital duty to support was
not affected because Nevada had not the legal power to decree dissolu-
tion -in that particular.
The dissenting justices cited no authority8 6 for their proposition
that New York must give the same effect to the Nevada decree as it
would a similar New York decree. Such is not required by the full
faith and credit clause37 and the statute passed pursuant thereto.38  The
requirement is that decrees "shall have such faith and credit . .. as
they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from which they
are taken."3 9 That such is the law was dramatically shown by the case
of Roche v. McDonald,40 wherein Washington was required to enforce
an Oregon judgment based on a Washington judgment which, by the
law of Washington, was absolutely void. The proposition of those dis-
senting could only be sustained under some vague notion of due process
or equal protection of the law. But assuming that the charge of dis-
crimination is true, is it not reasonable that New York should provide
that a New York support order does not survive a domestic decree of
divorce, while it does survive a foreign decree ?41 In a domestic divorce
so201 U. S. 562 (1906).
8,Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 HARv. L. REy. 930, 954 (1945).
's Bingham, In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock, 21 CORN. L. Q. 393, 421
(1936); Barnhard, Haddock Reversed-Harbinger of the Divisible Divorce, 31
Gao. L. J. 210, 222 (1943).
"' Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that New York could not consistently with the
first Williams case discriminate against Nevada decrees. See Estin v. Estin, 68
Sup. Ct. at 1220 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
7 U. S. CoNST. ART. IV §1, provides: "Full faith and credit shall be given in
each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other
state. .. "
"a 1 STAT. 122 (1790), as amended, 2 STAT. 299, 28 U. S. C. §687 (1946).
so Ibid.
,0 275 U. S. 449 (1927).
' The question as to domestic divorce has been answered in the affirmative by
some state courts. See, e.g., Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S. W. 977
(1910) ("Nor is there any necessary connection between divorce and alimony; a
divorce may be granted without alimony; and alimony may be granted where no
divorce is decreed."). But where the wife has secured a foreign divorce the cases
uniformly deny alimony on the ground that it is an incident of the marriage rela-
tion,; that severance of the relation terminates the right to alimony. See, e.g.
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proceeding, New York would have an opportunity to protect its interest
in the support of its domiciliary, whereas it would have no such oppor-
tunity in a foreign proceeding.
Confined to its facts, the holding of the case is that the state of the
husband's domicile has no power to adjudicate the rights of the absent
wife in a prior support order, issued by the state of last marital domicile
which had jurisdiction over both parties. Thus a serious question is
posed. If there had been no support order, could Mrs. Estin have
maintained a suit for support in New York? Language in the instant
case, 42 and in the concurring opinion in the Esenwein case43 would give
an affirmative answer. But this language was not necessary for the
holding in either case, both of which involved prior support orders. An
affirmative is also indicated by the fact that the Court refused to pass
on the credit due the New York decree by Nevada, but chose to put the
decision on the broader ground that Nevada had no power to adjudicate
rights in the New York decree." But it must be noted that the Court
characterized the New York decree as an intangible property right,
4"
over which jurisdiction can be obtained only by personal jurisdiction
over the owner. Would the mere right of the wife to receive support
in New York be classed as such a property right ?4
If the rule of the instant case applies to the duty of support, even in
the absence of a domestic decree, then the case of Haddock v. Haddock47
was either never overruled or has been revived. On its precise facts,
all that was decided by that case was that the state of the wife's domicile
need not give effect to a foreign divorce decree insofar as that decree
purported to destroy the husband's duty under the domestic law to
furnish economic support to his former wife, as though she were still
his wife.48 The case did not decide that Mr. and Mrs. Haddock were
still husband and wife. Since the Williams case 49 was not concerned
with the duty of support, the statement of Mr. Justice Douglas in that
case that, "Haddock v. Haddock is overruled" may be classified as
McCoy v. McCoy, 191 Iowa 973, 183 N. W. 377 (1921) ; Schweinwald v. Schwein-
wald, 231 App. Div. 757, 246 N. Y. Supp. 33 (2d Dep't 1930). If the wife appears
in the foreign proceeding she is bound by that decree both as to marital capacity
and duty of support. Coe v. Coe, 68 Sup. Ct. 1094 (1948).
4268 Sup. Ct. 1213, 1218 (1948).
"325 U. S. 279, 282 (1945).
"Estin v. Estin, 68 Sup. Ct. 1213, 1218 (1948).
Ibid.
" It may be easier for Nevada to refuse to enforce a foreign cause of action
than it would be to refuse to enforce a foreign judgment. Compare Roche v.
McDonald, 275 U. S. 449 (1927), with Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U. S.
412 (1918).
'1201 U. S. 562 (1906).
48 Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled? 18 IND. L. J. 165 (1942) ; Bing-
ham, In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock, 21 CoRIu. L. Q. 393 (1936); Powell,
And Repent at Leisure, 58 HARV. L. REv. 930 (1945).
"1 317 U. S. at 304 (1942).
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dictum.50 Due to the logical and verbal difficulty of granting the wife
separation and alimony if the marriage relation still existed, the case
was interpreted by many as holding that the foreign divorce was good
for no purpose.51 But this difficulty is obviated by recognizing the
marital status as being composed of separate elements.
In 1943, Professor Holt made a prediction that seems to have come
true: "Yet the bones of Haddock v. Haddock remain-unbleached and
unpulverized ... courts in states that do not favor free and easy ter-
mination of marriage may still find in the osseous remains of Haddock
v. Haddock material to fashion some puzzles for the Supreme Court of
the United States to solve .... 52
JAY W. ALEXANDER.
Courts-Federal Jurisdiction-State Court to Be Followed in
Diversity Cases under the Erie Rule
Prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' federal courts in diversity
of citizenship cases were bound to follow statutes of a state in deter-
mining the state law under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson 2 The Erie
case, interpreting the Rules of Decision Act,3 held that federal courts
must also follow the case law of the state as announced by its highest
court. "The Erie R. Co. case left open, however, the more difficult
question of the effect to be given to decisions by the lower state courts
on points never passed on by the highest state court."' 4 The Supreme
Court of the United States has, since the Erie case, held that a federal
court is not free to disregard the law of the state merely because it has
not been announced by the highest court of the state, but that, in the
absence of more persuasive data of what the state law is, they must
follow the decision of an intermediate state court.5
" Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled?, 18 IND. L. J. 165 (1942) ; Powell,
And Repent at Leisure, 58 HAxv. L. REv. 930 (1945).
"See e.g., BEALE, CONFLICTs OF LAWS §§113.10-113.12.
" Holt, The Bones of Haddock v. Haddock, 41 MicH. L. REv. 1013, 1036
(1943).
'304 U. S. 64 (1938).
* 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
'Judiciary Act of (Sept. 24) 1789, §34, REv. STAT. §721, 28 U.S.C. §725 (1946).
'King v. Order of United C6mmercial Travelers of America, 68 Sup. Ct. 488,
491 (1948).
'Six Companies of Calif. v. Joint Hy. Dist., 311 U. S. 180 (1940); West v.
American T. & T. Co., 311 U. S. 223 (1940); Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
311 U. S. 464 (1940). Accordingly, federal courts have followed decisions of
intermediate courts in the following states:
California-Six Companies of Calif. v. Joint Hy. Dist., 311 U. S. 180 (1940).
Delaware-United Automatic Rifles Corp. v. Johnson, 41 F. Supp. 86 (D. Mass.
1941.
Illinois-Pullman Std. Can Mfg. Co. v. Local Union U.S.W., 152 F. 2d 493
(C.C.A. 7th 1945).
Missouri-Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U. S. 464 (1940).
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